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Abstract 
This paper starts from the assessment that there is no good theory in the social sciences 
that would tell us whether fertility in low fertility countries is likely to recover in the 
future or will continue to fall. The question is key to the discussion whether or not 
governments should take action aimed at influencing the fertility rate. To enhance the 
scholarly discussion in this field, the paper introduces a clearly-defined hypothesis 
which describes plausible self-reinforcing mechanisms that would result, if unchecked, 
in a continued decrease of the number of births in Europe. This hypothesis has three 
components: a demographic one based on the negative population growth momentum, 
i.e., the fact that fewer potential mothers in the future will result in fewer births, a 
sociological one based on the assumption that ideal family size for the younger cohorts 
is declining as a consequence of the lower actual fertility they see in the previous 
cohorts, and an economic one based on the first part of the Easterlin (1980) relative 
income hypothesis, namely, that fertility results from the combination of aspirations and 
expected income, and assumes that aspirations are on an increasing trajectory while 
expected income for the younger cohorts declines, partly as a consequence of 
population ageing induced by low fertility. All three factors would work towards a 
downward spiral in births in the future. If there is reason to assume that such 
mechanisms will indeed be at work, then this should strengthen the motivation of 
governments to take immediate action (possibly through policies addressing the tempo 
effect) in order to still escape from the expected trap. 
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The Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis: 
Forces that may lead to further postponement 
and fewer births in Europe 
Wolfgang Lutz, Vegard Skirbekk, Maria Rita Testa 
1.  Introduction 
Over the last three decades birth rates have been on the decline in virtually all countries 
of the world, and it is estimated that already more than half of the world’s population 
has below replacement level fertility (Wilson 2004). An increasing number of countries 
have birth rates that are not just somewhat below replacement fertility, but far below 
that level. Measured in terms of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), currently 34 countries 
have fertility levels of 1.5 or less (PRB 2005). 
Is this low fertility here to stay? Will the birth rates recover or even continue to 
fall? Nobody knows! So far the social sciences have not produced a plausible theory of 
fertility that would have predictive power. There are not even many testable hypotheses 
in the field of fertility trends. In a recent paper, Lutz (2006) tries to summarize different 
arguments that have been put forward in the literature which suggest either higher or 
lower fertility in the future. He finds roughly an equal number of arguments for both 
directions, but there is no basis for weighting them in order to come up with an 
estimated net effect. Moreover, few of these arguments are precise enough to be subject 
to empirical testing. This is particularly the case with the rather vague arguments that 
suggest continued declines in fertility. Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to 
present and discuss a clearly-structured and consistent hypothesis which suggests that 
the birth rate in Europe will continue to decline, the key premises of which can be 
empirically tested. The purpose for doing so is to contribute to a more rational scholarly 
discussion about the future of fertility which could also be an important basis for the 
question whether governments should intervene and try to influence the course of 
fertility. Presenting the logic of this hypothesis and some supporting evidence does not 
imply that the authors actually believe that – viewing all things together – fertility will 
continue to decline. As should be done in scientific analysis, we try to separate our own 
beliefs from the scholarly discussion of a specific line of reasoning. 
The notion of a low fertility trap hypothesis (LFTH) has recently been 
introduced by Lutz and Skirbekk (2005) in the context of a paper dealing with policies 
addressing the tempo effect in low fertility countries. There the main argument was: If 
such a low fertility trap exists, then the rationale for implementing policies that would 
give a short-term boost to period fertility levels would be strengthened. Since there was 
not much elaboration of the LFTH itself in that paper, we will try to present a more 
extensive discussion here. 
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The paper will be structured as follows. After a short review of what recent 
international population projections assume about future fertility trends, we will present 
the full hypothesis and show how its different elements can work together to result in 
fewer births in the future. Then we will discuss separately the three elements of LFTH: 
the demographic, the sociological and the economic argument. We will end with a 
discussion about the empirical testability of the hypothesis and possible policy 
implications. 
2.  Why do current population projections assume that life 
expectancy continues to increase while fertility stops to 
decline? 
In the past decades, population projections were based on the expectation that after the 
end of the demographic transition, life expectancy would reach a certain maximum level 
and fertility would stabilize over the long run at around replacement level. The United 
Nations population projections give the longest series of consistent projections for all 
countries in the world and serve as a model for a large number of national population 
projections. Until very recently, they have assumed that there is a maximum life 
expectancy that no country in the world will surpass. In the 1973 assessment, this 
maximum life expectancy was assumed to be 72.6 years for men and 77.5 years for 
women (Bucht 1996). As time passed, many countries came close to or even passed this 
assumed maximum life expectancy. As a consequence, the UN has been slowly moving 
the assumed maximum life expectancy upwards. In the 1982 assessment of the UN 
projections, the maximum age was assumed to be 75 years for men and 82.5 years for 
women. Only 20 years after this assumption was made, a large number of countries had 
already surpassed the assumed maximum age and the trend in increasing life expectancy 
shows no sign of leveling off. In fact, the trend in the countries with the world’s highest 
life expectancy at any point in time shows an almost perfectly linear trend for more than 
a century with no sign of leveling off (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). As a consequence, in 
their most recent population projections, the UN has given up the assumption of a 
maximum life expectancy and assumes continuing improvements, although at a slowing 
speed (UN 2004). Most other statistical agencies now also assume a continued increase 
in life expectancy. 
But what about the future trend in fertility? In 1998, with a rapidly increasing 
number of countries falling much below the previously assumed magic target level of 
2.1 children per woman, the UN (1999) finally abandoned their previous assumption 
that all countries of the world would converge to 2.1 and that no country that was still 
above 2.1 would ever fall below 2.1. This magic number is now assumed to be 1.85. All 
countries that are now already below 1.3 are assumed to recover rather quickly to 1.85; 
countries that are still above 1.85 are assumed to never fall below that level. Eurostat 
(2005), in its most recent round of national population projections for all 25 EU member 
countries, makes significantly lower fertility assumptions than the UN in its medium 
scenario, which is considered to be the most likely one. Eurostat makes its assumptions 
in terms of cohort fertility, which is a much more stable indicator, and basically assumes 
that cohort fertility will not decline any further but rather will stabilize at it current 
level. In many cases this implies a moderate, near-term increase in period fertility, but 
much lower levels than assumed by the UN medium variant. 
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Figure 1.  Trends in cohort fertility (empirical and as assumed by UN and Eurostat 
projections) for three selected European countries: Italy for Southern Europe, Austria 
for Central Europe, and Sweden for Northern Europe. 
 
Figure 1 shows the trends in cohort fertility for three selected European 
countries: Italy for Southern Europe, Austria for Central Europe, and Sweden for 
Northern Europe. It gives the empirically-observed, completed cohort fertility, followed 
by the assumed fertility rates according to the UN (2005) and the Eurostat (2005) 
population projections, starting from the birth cohort of 1935 and going for 100 years to 
the birth cohort of 2035. Up to the birth cohort of 1965, the data are entirely empirical; 
after 1970, they are a mixture of empirical data for the younger ages and assumed 
fertility rates for the older ones; from the cohort of 1990 onwards, they are entirely 
assumed data according to either the UN or the Eurostat projections. 
The empirical data for Italy and Austria show an almost linear, steep decline in 
cohort fertility, from the cohorts born in 1935 to those born in 1985. For these 40 years, 
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each successive cohort had lower completed fertility than the previous one. The fertility 
trends assumed by Eurostat and the UN imply an abrupt end of the pervasive trend only 
for the cohorts born after 1985. The UN even implies a significant increase. For Austria 
and Italy, the UN assumes that cohort fertility would increase with almost the same 
speed as it decreased over the past decades, and the birth cohorts of 2025 will again 
have the same level of fertility as the birth cohorts of 1950. The Eurostat assumptions 
are less extreme and assume only an increase back up to the level of the cohorts born in 
1965 for Italy and Austria. 
The cohort trend was less linear in Sweden. After an initial decline, the birth 
cohorts of 1945 to 1960 saw a moderate increase in completed fertility levels which 
then was followed by a steep and almost linear decline parallel to those in Italy and 
Austria. But since cohort fertility in Sweden is currently still at a significantly higher 
level than in the two other countries, Eurostat, according to its philosophy of constant 
cohort fertility, assumes levels for the future that are not so different from the 1.85 that 
the UN assumes for all countries in the world. Hence, in Sweden, the UN and the 
Eurostat assumptions imply an abrupt discontinuity in the trend of cohort fertility. 
For what reasons do these projections assume such an unusual reversal in the 
trend? Typically in trend analysis, one would need to come up with a very strong and 
convincing reason to justify such a deviation from the pervasive trend of the past 50 
years of cohort experience. Even more surprisingly, not even the low fertility scenarios 
produced by these agencies assume a continuation of the trend of the past decades. 
Furthermore, none of these population projections provide the users with a clear 
theoretical reasoning for why, in the case of fertility, the declining trend is assumed to 
reverse, while in the case of mortality, it is assumed to continue. When looking at the 
assumed drivers of mortality decline, ranging from lifestyle factors to medical progress, 
there are indeed good reasons to assume that likely improvements in these fields will 
result in further mortality declines. But the same seems to be true for the generally 
assumed drivers of the fertility decline of the past decades, ranging from the decline of 
traditional family patterns to more female education, continuing secularization and 
increasing uncertainty about the future resulting from rapid social change and 
globalization. There is no reason to assume a reversal in the trends of many of these 
determinants of fertility decline in the near future. But why do projections assume a 
reversal in the trend of the outcome, i.e., fertility? 
This deviation from the conventional rules of trend analysis must have to do 
with strong beliefs that somehow there is a powerful force that will stop and even 
reverse the trend, i.e., that at the individual level, people will always want children, and 
that at the aggregate level, human populations would not voluntarily shrink and age to 
an extent that would be socially disruptive or in the very long run even mean extinction. 
From an evolutionary perspective, these seem to be reasonable assumptions because a 
species without a drive to reproduce would not have survived to this day. But there is a 
strong counterargument, namely, that through the introduction of modern contraception, 
the evolutionary link between the drive for sex and procreation has been broken and 
now reproduction is merely a function of individual preferences and culturally 
determined norms. Since social norms can change and in related fields, such as the role 
of women in society, have indeed shown fundamental changes over the recent history, it 
cannot be ruled out that the social norms about the desire to have children will see 
similar, fundamental changes over the coming decades. Since such norms tend to 
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change very slowly and the widespread use of modern contraception is only a rather 
recent phenomenon in Europe, the current, still apparent desire for children (although 
already on the decline in some countries) may simply reflect a cultural lag. This lag 
could be similar in nature to the well-studied lag in desired family size in the process of 
demographic transition, in which high fertility desires can persist several decades after 
infant and child mortality have declined. 
Whether after the break of the evolutionary link between sex and fertility the 
future of reproduction is entirely a function of potentially instable, individual 
preferences and social norms, or whether there are other aspects of human nature, such 
as a caring reflex (at least among women), that may ensure a persistence of a certain 
desired family size, is a question that needs much further research. Here it is sufficient 
to conclude that there does not seem to be any “natural law” that would stop fertility 
from falling further, should preferences and norms change accordingly. 
3.  Three mechanisms that may cause a downward spiral in 
future birth rates 
Our thinking about the possibility of a low fertility trap was triggered by the recent 
observation of Peter McDonald (2005), who said that there tend to be two distinct 
groups of low fertility countries: those where the TFR has stayed above 1.5 and those 
where it has fallen below the supposedly critical level and stayed below ever since. 
McDonald also points at the fact that in a recent UN survey about population policy, all 
countries with TFRs of 1.5 or below say that they consider their fertility level as too 
low. McDonald hypothesizes that it is more difficult for a country to bring fertility up 
to, say, 1.6 once it has already fallen to levels of 1.3 or 1.4 than to keep fertility above 
1.6. From this assumption he derives the recommendation to governments that they 
should make efforts to keep fertility above this critical level and let not fall it below. 
Whether or not one assumes that there is a specific critical watershed level 
around a TFR of 1.5 – we do not want to make this point in our paper – the underlying 
thinking of a non-linear dose-response relationship between government efforts and the 
response of fertility is a welcome contribution to broadening our thinking about the 
relationship between potential drivers of fertility and the actual fertility change. Because 
linear regressions have become such a popular analytical tool, we are used to thinking 
that a unit change in the driver always results in a certain change of fertility, no matter 
at what level of fertility and under what side conditions this happens. But there are 
likely to be all kinds of non-linearities and possible feedback loops that may result in a 
bifurcation process. This may include what sociologists might call a change in the 
demographic regime. For fertility this may imply that once fertility has fallen below 
certain levels and stayed there for a certain time, it might be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to reverse such a regime change. Recent work by Rindfuss et al. (2004) on 
social transitions in Japan supports this assumption of non-linear, self-reinforcing 
processes in social change with thresholds and tipping points. 
Is it justified to call this possible mechanism of irreversible (or hardly reversible) 
regime change a “trap,” a notion that neither McDonald nor Rindfuss use? If a trap is 
defined as an unpleasant situation (governments would rather see higher fertility) into 
which one enters unintentionally and of which it is very difficult to get out, then indeed 
the described demographic regime change may be called a trap. But in addition to 
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postulating the possibility of such a tipping point in fertility, it would be good to be able 
to identify and describe the possible mechanisms that would constitute such a self-
reinforcing process toward lower birth rates, and consequently accelerating the ageing 
and shrinking that are difficult to escape. In the following we will describe three such 
mechanisms: a demographic one, one related to social norms and an economic one. 
The LFTH as presented here consists of these three independent elements that all 
work in the same direction and can reinforce each other. While the first is a 
demographic accounting truism, the two others are testable sub-hypotheses. One may 
classify the three mechanisms as demographic, sociological and economic. To better 
distinguish between these three independent forces, we call them LFT-1 to LFT-3. In 
this section we will give a short overview and show in a schematic chart how they 
independently influence the birth rate. In the following sections we will then discuss 
LFT-2 and LFT-3 individually, because they are not yet as well understood as LFT-1. 
On the left-hand side of Figure 2 we see the different measures of fertility. Since 
the different assumed mechanisms influence these different aspects of fertility in 
different ways, it is important to clearly distinguish between them. At the bottom we 
have the end result of this chain of influences, which is the absolute number of births in 
a population. This is what matters for population growth and for the change in the age 
structure; therefore, it is seen as the final explanandum in our analysis. If populations of 
different sizes shall be compared, then the absolute number of births can be replaced by 
the crude birth rate, which is an equivalent measure, the only difference being that it is 
standardized by the total population size. The absolute number of births is, in turn, a 
direct function of the age-pattern of period fertility and the age structure of the 
population. Period fertility, in turn, results from a combination of cohort fertility and 
shifts in the timing of fertility, which can have different determinants. Finally, we 
assume that the level of cohort fertility is also influenced by norms indicating the ideal 
personal family size. These norms are also subject to changes as will be described. In 
studies about the determinants of birth rates, it is not yet common to clearly distinguish 
between these four different levels of measuring reproduction. If it were to be used 
more consistently, it could help avoid unnecessary confusion. 
As described in Figure 2, LFT-1 operates at the level of population dynamics 
and refers to what demographers sometimes call the negative momentum of population 
growth. It is based on the well-known, demographic mechanism that the age distribution 
of a population exerts an independent influence on the number of births or the crude 
birth rate, which is not a function of the fertility level of that period, but results from 
past fertility, mortality and migration. This momentum can be a force towards shrinking 
in the case of a history of very low fertility that has modified the population age 
structure to such an extent that fewer and fewer women will enter the reproductive age 
and, hence, the number of births will decline, even in the hypothetical case that fertility 
instantly jumped to replacement level. This process in itself causes a downward spiral in 
the number of births. If there are fewer births today, there will be fewer potential 
mothers down the road, which in turn will bring the number of births further down. 
This purely demographic mechanism (LFT-1) is shown in the lower left corner 
in Figure 2. It shows the absolute number of births in a given year as a function of the 
level of period fertility and the age structure of the population. While the level of period 
fertility is determined by the rest of the model, the two solid lines give the feedback 
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mechanism that is part of LFT-1: The number of births influences the age structure of 
the population and some three decades later, this modified age structure determines how 
many births will result from a given level of period fertility. Of course the age structure 
can also be influenced by mortality and migration, but this is viewed as exogenous in 
LFTH. Instead of the absolute number of births, one may consider the crude birth rate 
(births divided by the total population size) as an output variable that lends itself better 
to international comparisons. But in the end, it is the number of births that counts in 
determining the age structure and, hence, all consequences of a changing age structure. 
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Figure 2.  The demographic (LFT-1), sociological (LFT-2) and economic (LFT-3) 
mechanisms that constitute the Low Fertility Trap Hypothesis. 
 
LFT-2 refers to a mechanism based on sociological reasoning. It is structured 
around the concept of personal ideal family size, which is assumed to be one of the 
factors determining actual cohort fertility. Personal ideal family size tends to be 
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markedly higher than actual fertility, but it seems to be on the decline in several 
European countries (Goldstein et al. 2003). LFT-2 is based on the hypothesis that such a 
decline is triggered by declines in actual fertility some time ago. It is assumed that 
through the processes of socialization and social learning, the social norms and in 
particular the family size ideals of the young generation are influenced by what they 
experience around them in term of families with young children. The fewer the children 
belonging to the environment that the young people experience, the lower the number of 
children that will be part of their normative system in terms of what is a desirable life. 
Hence, in Figure 2, the feedback loop goes from the actual number of births in a 
population to the number of people with young children a few years later. This in turn is 
viewed as a key determinant of the personal ideal family size. 
LFT-3 is based on an economic rationale referring to the gap between personal 
aspirations for consumption and expected income, which is assumed to result in fewer 
births. This argument is directly derived from Richard Easterlin’s (1980) relative 
income hypothesis which claims that it is not the absolute (expected) income that 
matters, but rather income relative to the aspirations that are largely formed in one’s 
youth, and greatly dependent on the standard of living in the parental home. This first 
element of Easterlin’s hypothesis has always been in the shadow of the second, much 
more controversial element, namely, that small cohort size will result in higher expected 
income. In this hypothesis, we will only refer to the first element, which is the less 
problematic one and has given the relative income hypothesis its name. In the more 
detailed discussion below, we will elaborate a bit on the second part, which does not 
seem to be a dominant force prevalent in Europe today. 
In Figure 2, LFT-3 is represented by the solid lines. The gap between aspiration 
and expected income is a result of distinct changes affecting these two factors. As to 
expected income, a declining number of births is shaping the age distribution in a way 
that will result in more rapid ageing, which in turn triggers necessary changes in the 
current social security system, which typically means cuts that will mostly effect 
today’s younger cohorts while being softer and more gradual for the older ones. In 
addition to this rather evident deterioration of expected social security benefits for the 
younger cohorts, rapid population ageing may also result in lower productivity and 
consequently in a globalized economy, less investment and lower economic growth in 
the future. Both factors are resulting in a more pessimistic economic outlook for today’s 
younger generations, which is widely documented in opinion surveys. On the other 
hand, aspirations for material consumption are probably higher today than they ever 
were before. Today’s youngsters are not only experiencing an unprecedented degree of 
exposure to advertising aimed at further raising the aspirations for consumption, but 
they also tend to come from relatively wealthy homes, their parents having fully 
benefited from the economic boom of the past decades. There is also a demographic 
factor: due to the fertility decline, since the 1970s children have had to share parental 
wealth with fewer siblings, a factor that helped to raise the standard of living to which 
they have become accustomed. 
In terms of the effect of this widening gap between aspirations and expected 
income (in the left column of Figure 2), we may assume two different effects of fertility. 
First and foremost, this declining, relative income would (according to Easterlin) affect 
the quantum of fertility, i.e., cohort fertility. But the extensive recent literature on the 
postponement of fertility and the resulting increase in the mean age of childbearing, 
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which has an independent effect on depressing period fertility (the tempo effect), 
suggests that such a gap would also result in postponement. Young people are not yet 
certain how their future income will develop. Therefore, a likely reaction is to postpone 
the decision to have children until a later date when the future may look clearer. Hence 
in Figure 2, we have two effects of declining relative income, one on the translation of 
personal ideals into actually wanted cohort fertility, and the other in the process of the 
timing of fertility, i.e., the translation of cohort into period fertility. 
In the following sections there will be more detailed discussion of LFT-1 and 
LFT-2 mechanisms. Since LFT-1 has already been well studied and documented, it 
suffices to say that this simple consequence of the dynamics of age-structured 
populations implies that as a result of low fertility over the past years, fewer women 
(potential mothers) will be entering the reproductive age in the future. This exerts a 
significant downward pressure on the absolute number of births and the crude birth rate. 
It has been estimated that several countries and the EU as a whole have recently entered 
a period of negative population momentum, which technically is defined as an age 
structure implying future population shrinking, even if fertility should instantly increase 
to replacement level (keeping mortality constant and assuming no migration) (Lutz et al. 
2003). With historically-given age structures, this negative momentum is an 
independent force toward fewer births in the future. The lower the fertility rate in the 
near term future, the stronger the force of negative momentum in the longer term future. 
While this demographic component of the LFT is purely an accounting effect at the 
aggregate level, the following two mechanisms relate to behavioral aspects. 
4.  LFT-2:  Declines in ideal family size 
The second element of LFT relates to changes in ideal family size. It is based on an 
assumed reciprocal interaction between ideal and actual family size. Since this has 
already been discussed in other publications, we will only summarize the state of the 
discussion here and not present any new empirical data. 
In demography there has been a long research tradition which is based on the 
assumption that at least to a certain degree actual fertility is influenced by fertility 
preferences. This is also reflected in the fact that several indicators of fertility 
preferences have become standard components of fertility surveys around the world for 
several decades. These indicators include societal ideal, personal ideal, desired family 
size, expected family size and others. Such indicators have also become an important 
basis for population policy rationales, particularly in developing countries where the 
main rationale of the Cairo 1994 ICPD rests on the observation that in many developing 
countries, desired family size is lower than actual fertility and hence policies should 
help couples to close this gap by meeting the unmet need for family planning, which in 
consequence would lead to lower fertility rates. In low fertility countries, a gap exists in 
the other direction, with ideal family sizes as measured in surveys being typically higher 
than actual fertility rates. This offers policymakers in Europe a seemingly convenient 
policy rationale to try to help couples to actually have the (higher) family size that they 
would like to have in any case. But so far trying to close this gap in Europe has been a 
less successful endeavor than closing the opposite gap in a number of developing 
countries (Hagewen and Morgan 2005). 
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While it is a relatively clear argument that couples who do not have access to 
acceptable forms of contraception have more children than they want, and that making 
such services available will result in closing the gap, it is less clear what should be made 
available to couples that have fewer children than they say they want. In modern 
societies couples have several competing preferences; since they usually cannot meet all 
these wishes at the same time (some may even be mutually exclusive), they usually 
have fewer children than they say in surveys they would like to have (Demeny 2003). 
For this reason, the stated family size ideals are also sometimes considered to be an 
upper bound for actual fertility (van Peer 2002). 
But fertility preferences are not static; they tend to change over time and do so 
mostly in the direction of lower family size. In many (former) high fertility countries, 
rapid declines in desired family sizes are well documented by the series of World 
Fertility Surveys and Demographic and Health Surveys, and are assumed to be an 
important driver of the observed fertility declines. In the industrialized countries, 
measured ideal family sizes have been relatively stable (typically above replacement 
level) over the past decades, but there have been recent indications of a decline in some 
European countries (Goldstein et al. 2003). This is where LFT-2 comes into play and 
where it is assumed that after some years of stability, ideal family size may now enter a 
period of decline, particularly in those countries that recently experienced very low 
actual fertility rates. 
There are good reasons to assume that preferences can be influenced by actual 
fertility. One can assume that the young generations form their own family size ideals, 
like other norms and expectations, by looking at the actual childbearing behavior of 
their parents or what they see as the family size of other influential people. As with 
many normative changes, there can be a significant time lag, which may explain why in 
many countries ideals still seem to be high, while at the same time actual period fertility 
is very low. A good example for such a lag in the change of family size norms can be 
found in the developing countries, where in the process of demographic transition, it 
often took several decades for fertility norms to change in reaction to mortality declines. 
But after such a lag, fertility norms have almost universally started to decline. The key 
question in this context is: Will fertility norms continue to decline or is there something 
that will keep them from falling below replacement level? With respect to actual 
fertility, for decades population forecasters have assumed that it would not fall below 
replacement only to find that already more than half of the world’s population today is 
below replacement. Could this also happen to fertility ideals, particularly if one assumes 
that ideals are not independent from actual fertility? This follows the same logic as 
described by Rindfuss et al. (2004, p. 855) in the context of changing Japanese marriage 
behavior: “Changes in attitudes likely create a feedback mechanism, influencing 
behavior; and changes in behavior likely create a feedback mechanism influencing 
attitudes.” Here the argument would go as follows: Once the number of children 
(siblings, friends, children seen in other families, media) experienced during the process 
of socialization falls below a certain level, the own ideal family size would become 
lower, which in course may result in further declining actual family size and still lower 
ideals in the subsequent generation. 
The idea that changes in fertility preferences may lag behind changes in actual 
reproductive behavior is not new in the literature (Lee 1980). Recently, it has been taken 
as an explanation of the emergence of below replacement family size ideals in Europe 
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(Goldstein et al. 2003). After decades of a large predominance of the two-child norm in 
fertility preferences, in 2001 young women in the German-speaking countries reported 
an average, ideal family size of 1.7 children (Goldstein et al. 2003). The authors explain 
such a decline by the drop of period fertility that in Germany and Austria occurred 
earlier than in other European countries. The German-speaking women showing sub-
replacement family size ideals for the first time were born during the baby bust of the 
1970s and have been socialized in smaller families. These females’ generations would 
have taken the actual family size of their parents’ generation, i.e., one or two children, 
as a standard for their own ideal family size. 
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Note: INC = ideal number of children. Probabilities computed for the base individual 
(not enrolled in school, married, employed, living in a household with less than four 
adults, with a household income below average, living in the western region of West 
Germany). The two vertical lines denote the replacement fertility level (2.1 children) 
and the very low fertility level fixed at 1.5 children. In the sample, the x-variable 
ranges from 1.00 to 3.19, with a mean of 1.97 and a standard deviation of 0.36. 
 
Figure 3.  Effect of the mean number of children ever born among older generations on 
the younger generations’ individual probability of a given ideal family size. All 
respondents were aged 20 to 39 and desired at least one child. EU-15, Year 2001. 
Source: Testa and Grilli (2006). 
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Using a multilevel approach, Testa and Grilli (2006) give an empirical 
foundation to the assumption that changing fertility ideals lag behind the changes in 
actual reproductive behavior, and interpret this relationship in an intergenerational 
micro-macro framework, where the context plays a major role. The authors showed that 
in the regional fertility contexts, where the mean actual number of children of the old 
(parents) generations is lower, the young individuals have a higher probability to prefer 
smaller families (Testa and Grilli 2006). In addition, the authors found that such a 
relationship is stronger in areas with below replacement fertility levels, especially when 
fertility is below 1.5 children. Figure 3, taken from their analysis, plots the mean 
regional number of children born to the generation aged 40 to 60 versus the individual 
probability of preferring a given family size of young individuals aged 20 to 39 coming 
from the estimates of the multilevel model used by Testa and Grilli (2006). Although 
the figure has to be interpreted in a cross-section framework – the data come from one 
cross-sectional survey and simply reflect the regional differences – the picture can shed 
some light on the reasons why the two-child norm has been so stable in the last few 
years: at very low levels of actual fertility, the two-child norm starts to decrease and the 
ideal one-child family becomes more and more likely. 
According to the authors, one of the possible mechanisms responsible for the 
relationship between contextual childbearing features and individual behavior may be 
the social learning process between young and old that does not necessarily have to go 
through the children-parent relationship, although the family context may take a very 
important role (Axinn et al. 1994; Murphy 1999; Fernández and Fogli 2005). However, 
further analysis would be needed to investigate which mechanism lies behind the 
intergenerational transmission of ideal family size. 
The analysis by Testa and Grilli (2006) may provide an answer to a possible key 
criticism of such a hypothesis of a downward spiral of actual and ideal family size, 
namely, that declining fertility already experienced in the previous decades has not yet 
been accompanied by generally decreasing fertility ideals. An exciting new test of this 
hypothesis will be possible when the data from the Eurobarometer 2006, which has 
questions on ideal family size identical to that of 2001, become available. 
5.  LFT-3:  The relative income argument 
5.1.  Easterlin’s reasoning 
The main reasoning for this part of the low fertility trap hypothesis is directly taken 
from Richard Easterlin’s (1980) relative income hypothesis. In a section on the 
determinants of fertility, Easterlin writes: 
I believe that an important factor affecting a young couple’s willingness to 
marry and to have children is their outlook for supporting their material 
aspirations. If the couple’s potential earning power is high in relation to 
aspirations, they will have an optimistic outlook and will feel freer to 
marry and have children. If their outlook is poor relative to aspirations, the 
couple will feel pessimistic and, consequently, will be hesitant to marry 
and have children. … Note that two elements enter into the judgment 
about the couple’s economic prospects. One is their potential earning 
power; the other is their material aspirations. (Easterlin 1980, p. 39) 
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These two factors described by Easterlin also form the basis of the LFT-3 
mechanism as described in Figure 2. Both the level of cohort fertility and the timing of 
fertility are assumed to be influenced by the ratio of expected income to aspirations. 
Easterlin defines quite precisely what he means by material aspirations, which 
he views as the lifestyle learned in the family or origin: 
By life-style, I mean how the material standards of young adults are 
formed – why one generation, say, views a car as a luxury and the next, a 
necessity. My argument is that the material expectations of young adults 
are largely the unconscious product of the environment in which they grow 
up. … And this environment is very largely shaped by the economic 
circumstances, or income, of one’s parents. ( Easterlin 1980, pp. 40-41) 
Easterlin then proposes to use the income of the father as a proxy for the level of 
aspirations and the income of the young man as a proxy for expected income. The ratio 
of these two income measures of younger workers to older workers should then provide 
a quantitative proxy for relative income. If the ratio increases, then relative income 
increases and fertility will be higher; if it decreases, then fertility can be expected to 
decline. Easterlin showed that this can offer a plausible explanation of the US baby 
boom followed by a fertility decline. 
How relevant is this relative income argument for Europe today? Can it provide 
guidance for making assumptions about the future of fertility? In the following we will 
present some empirical evidence showing that indeed in many parts of Europe, relative 
income seems to be on the decline, and there are no convincing reasons to dismiss the 
argument put forward by Easterlin that indeed this should be a factor in determining 
future fertility declines. To avoid confusion, it is important to stress at this point that we 
do not refer to the second part of Easterlin’s hypothesis, namely, the assumption that 
smaller cohorts will have higher incomes. This assumption seems much more 
problematic in the European context and will be discussed briefly at the end of this 
section. Our reasoning here refers exclusively to the relative income argument as 
described above. 
Figure 4 plots the relative income measure proposed by Easterlin for three 
selected countries for which age-specific income data are available from the 1970s 
onwards. We differ from Easterlin’s proposal by also including the income of 
economically-active women, which can no longer be disregarded today. Ideally, the 
income data for the parents should refer to the period during which the young 
generation experienced its socialization, and should be adjusted for changes in 
purchasing power. Since the necessary data are difficult to find, Easterlin (1980) uses 
only the father’s income lagged by five years. Here, as a first approximation, we 
compare the incomes of the two age groups in the same period. The ratio plotted in 
Figure 4 is the income of economically-active men and women aged 25-34, which refers 
to the mean childbearing age group, divided by the income of economically-active men 
and women aged 45-54, which is supposed to capture the income of the parental 
generation. This ratio should be above 1.0 if young people have higher expected income 
than aspirations, which according to Easterlin should result in higher fertility. Any value 
below 1.0 shows that expected income falls short of aspirations and should result in a 
fertility depressing effect. The figure clearly shows that all values are significantly 
below 1.0 for the three countries studied and for both time periods, 1971-1980 and 
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1991-2000. The ratio is lowest in Japan, and somewhat higher in Sweden and the UK. 
Based only on the data for 1971-1980, one would have expected fertility to decline 
during the 1970s, which actually was the case. But over the following decades the 
relative income ratio has not recovered but rather continued to decline. This is in sharp 
contrast to the expectation that Easterlin based on the second part of his hypothesis, 
namely, that relative income would increase for the smaller cohorts entering the labor 
market. This led him to expect a new baby boom for the 1990s. But in all three 
countries, the young cohorts aged 25-34 in 1991-2000 had an even lower relative 
income than the same age groups 20 years earlier. In light of these trends in relative 
income, the continued low fertility in the 1990s was no surprise. 
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Figure 4.  Relative income (income of active persons aged 25-34 divided by the income 
of active persons aged 45-54) in the 1970s and 1990s in three selected countries with 
data. 
 
What does this imply for the future? Can we expect that the trend in relative 
income will reverse itself in the near future and that young adults will have higher 
incomes than what they see with their parents? Probably not. One can, of course, doubt 
that the chosen measure of relative income that compares two age groups at one point in 
time gives a good approximation of the relationship of the two factors aspirations and 
expected income. For this reason, in the following we will review some broader 
evidence and data on the two variables that enter the relative income argument, and find 
out if we have reason to assume certain trends in the future. 
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5.2  Economic aspirations 
Even if it is very hard to predict how the (absolute) income of younger people will 
develop in Europe in the future, it seems fair to say that the general aspirations from 
material consumption have been on the rise for quite some time and are unlikely to 
decline soon. This may be due in part to the increasing wealth in parental homes, and to 
a penetrating advertising industry in which increasing material consumption, especially 
of certain expensive brands, is portrayed as the only avenue to satisfaction and 
happiness. Several youth surveys show that young people seem to be particularly open 
to this kind of enhancement to consumption aspiration. Given this apparently strong 
increase in aspirations and a more modest increase (or even decline) in the purchasing 
power of younger workers, personal satisfaction with the level of consumption will 
possibly never be reached. Advertisers no longer simply tell people about a product and 
how it would improve the purchaser’s life, but they sell a lifestyle, an image, an easy-to-
achieve identity that could be made one’s own. One might argue that consumption 
ideals are likely to be set higher (but not unattainably higher) than what individuals 
currently consume, in order to maximize sales and profits. If this is true, this implies 
that the match between aspirations and expected purchasing power for the broad 
segments of the population will continue to be unfavorable. 
Statistics Norway (2005) shows that annual per-person consumption increased 
from slightly above 60,000 to around 150,000 NOK from 1970 to 2003 (year 2000 
prices). Iacoviello (2005) states that US household debt, having been relatively stable 
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, has jumped out of proportion since the 1980s, with 
real activity rising between 1981 and 2003 from 67 percent to 113 percent of disposable 
personal income. Increases in household debt as compared to disposable income have 
occurred in most countries where data are available, and even stronger increases than in 
the US took place in the Netherlands, Denmark and Australia (Debelle 2004). 
Stutzer (2004) shows that as people get richer, their material aspirations 
increase. Consistent with processes of adaptation and social comparison, income 
aspirations increase with people’s income as well as with the average income in the 
community they live in. Furthermore, Stutzer’s analysis shows that higher consumption 
aspirations decrease wellbeing. 
5.3  Declining relative wellbeing of the young 
In Sweden, studies show that the feeling of insecurity has increased for the younger age 
groups as relative living standards for them have decreased over time from 1980-2003 
(Vogel and Råbäck  2004; SCB 2005). While the unemployment level in peak 
childbearing ages (25-29 year olds) was 1-4 percent from 1970 -1991, it fluctuated 
between 5-14 percent in the period 1992-2003. While in 1986 only 14 percent had 
temporary work contracts, by 2003 25 percent did. During the same period, the share 
who reported having stressful work in the age-group 25-29 increased from 7 percent to 
13 percent. 
Even health disadvantages seem to have increased more for the younger age 
groups than for the older. The percentage with reported health problems increased from 
7 percent to 10 percent for the 20-24 year olds, while it decreased from 41 percent to 36 
percent for the 60-64 year olds. Likewise, a loss of trust and interest in politics seems 
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more evident as the share of 22-29 year olds, who took part in elections, decreased from 
86 percent to 73 percent from 1970 to 2002, while the voting share of 65-74 year olds 
decreased by only about half as much, from 91 percent to 84 percent. Young people 
have also disproportionately become victims of crime: 15 percent of 20-24 year olds 
were exposed to crime in 2003, while it was only 10 percent in 1980. Meanwhile, the 
rate of suffering from a crime was stable at around 2 percent for the 65-69 year olds. 
Individuals in their 20s are less likely to have access to cars in 2003 than they had in 
1980. Likewise, available living space has gotten tighter for the younger people and 
better for the older. The number of individuals per 100 rooms increased from 59 to 65 
from 1980 to 2003 for 20-24 year olds, while it decreased from 41 to 34 for the 60-64 
year olds. 
In comparison with other group inequalities, generational inequality is 
expanding in relation to others. Joachim Voegel and Lars Häll write: “Statistics 
Sweden’s surveys and previous reports show that, among other things, class and gender 
differences have been reduced in the long term, while generation differences have 
increased as far back as we can follow in the statistics.” (SCB 2005, p. 111) 
Unfortunately, for many other European countries, no comparable studies about the 
relative wellbeing of younger people versus older ones seem to exist. One might expect 
that particularly in the Southern European countries, this trend of declining relative 
wellbeing for the younger generation is even more pronounced. If the available youth 
unemployment rates are taken as an indicator, there is now doubt about this. While 
youth unemployment rates in 2001 were 12 percent in Sweden and only 4 percent in the 
Netherlands, they were 21 percent in Spain, 27 percent in Italy and 28 percent in 
Greece. Combined with high aspirations for consumption, this is likely to result in a 
miserable relative income for the young. 
LFT-3 assumes that such declining relative income is not only the result of 
exogenous trends, but can in part be seen as a consequence of lower fertility in the past 
and the resulting population ageing. There are two possible effects, one at the household 
level and one at the macro level. The first effect tends to increase the aspirations 
through declining family size, i.e., youngsters today on average have to share the 
parental wealth with fewer siblings and hence, experience a higher standard of living in 
their childhood. The other mechanism operates at the societal level, where governments 
have to reform the social security system as a consequence of population, which almost 
universally tends to result in the hardest cut for the younger generations. Almost all 
pension reforms and early retirement schemes are phased in slowly, giving those still 
working in their 50s (who tend to represent the majority among politicians and trade 
union officials who negotiate the deals) the opportunity to still benefit from the 
generous old systems. Even reforms of the labor market, which have to do away with 
old privileges, are sometimes restricted to the younger ones. One only has to think of 
the recent French law, where only people below the age of 26 are affected by this 
liberalization. In this light it does not surprise us that an increasing number of youths in 
Europe has a pessimistic outlook for the future. 
Another key factor is the price of housing, which increasingly tends to present a 
barrier to home establishment of young couples who are in principle willing to establish 
their own family. These have risen substantially over the last decades. In most EU 
countries, housing prices have outstripped increases in average disposable income (ECB 
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2003), which is particularly true for the young who have had a lower level and growth 
of disposable income than other age groups (OECD 1998). 
5.4  Effect of relative cohort size 
As mentioned above, in the second part of his relative income hypothesis, Easterlin 
argues that smaller cohort sizes will improve labor market prospects for the young and 
lead to higher relative income. Since most people do not distinguish the second part of 
Easterlin’s hypothesis from the first, which is the one that we focus on, we should 
briefly discuss the issue in order to avoid confusion. A brief, but in this context, clearly 
non-exhaustive discussion makes sense because this second part can be seen as an 
argument for expecting a recovery of relative income and, therefore, a recovery of 
fertility in Europe over the coming years, when smaller cohorts enter the labor market. 
For the U.S., Easterlin (1980) finds that in the 1950s, there were few new labor 
market entrants and at the same time good labor market prospects, while in the 1970s, 
there were many new labor market entrants and poor labor market prospects. He argues 
that the inverse association between cohort size and labor market opportunities is 
causal, which is why the assumption of a negative relationship between cohort size and 
aggregate labor market outcomes is often termed the “Easterlin hypothesis.” 
Studies supporting this assumption, at least in one direction in terms of larger 
cohorts having a negative effect, include Korenman and Neumark (2000). Using a 
sample of OECD countries, they find that there is a weak increase in youth 
unemployment rates when larger cohorts enter the labor market. Martin and Ogawa 
(1988) consider the Japanese case and find that the wage ratios of 20-29 to 40-49 year 
olds in Japan is reduced by one percent when the share of the former increases by 10 
percent. Similar findings using American data are provided by Gordon (1982) and 
Shimer (1998). Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) analyze OECD data and find 
that the relation between cohort size and unemployment is evident mostly when labor 
markets are rigid. If such effects of cohort size exist, they are mostly temporal, 
disappearing when labor markets have adjusted to changes in the labor supply. When 
labor markets are flexible, larger cohorts more easily integrate into the labor market. 
Also, the possible presence of such an effect of larger cohort size leading to worse 
conditions for the members of that cohort does not necessarily imply that the reverse 
will be true and smaller cohort size will lead to improved conditions. 
Recent empirical evidence even suggests the possibility of an effect that goes in 
the opposite direction as proposed by Easterlin. A survey of 34 countries finds that 
fewer young people means fewer start-ups of new enterprises and fewer jobs, as peak 
entrepreneurial activity takes place in the young ages 25-44, which may imply that 
population ageing could cause less job creation (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2004). Hence, belonging to small cohorts may negatively affect overall labor market 
conditions, and smaller cohorts could mean fewer start-ups of new enterprises and fewer 
jobs. 
Shimer (2001) analyses evidence for spatial units in the U.S. These more 
disaggregated data suggest that smaller cohort sizes tend to lead to worse employment 
and labor market conditions. Smaller youth cohorts in a region are associated with lower 
labor force participation rates and increased unemployment levels. Shimer argues that 
 18
this is because firms tend to relocate away from where labor supply is expected to 
decrease, and information on cohort sizes of future labor market entrants are easily 
available. Following Shimer’s regional data approach for Sweden, using data from 
1985-1999, Skans (2005) finds evidence that young workers are negatively affected by 
belonging to a small cohort. 
This short discussion of some recent empirical evidence and studies focusing on 
the role of cohort size referring to the second part of Easterlin’s hyothesis can by no 
means be seen as an exhaustive discussion of the issue. It only sheds some doubts on the 
widely held expectation that somehow a smaller cohort size will automatically result in 
higher income for the members of the smaller cohorts. Market rigidities and several 
other factors discussed above may indeed make it worse for the members of smaller 
cohorts. This would be more in line with the reasoning of Preston (1984) in his PAA 
presidential address, where he shows that the power and the money tend to go where the 
large cohorts are. This factor is reinforced by our democratic systems in which the 
young under 18 years of age cannot cast a vote, and where the elderly tend to have 
much better, organized lobbies. 
6.  Conclusions 
As mentioned in the introduction, this contribution is meant to stimulate the informed 
and science-based discussion about the future of fertility. It does not wish to say that 
very low fertility countries are already trapped in a downward spiral of lower fertility. It 
only wishes to point to this possibility as something that should be taken into serious 
consideration. 
The future level of fertility in Europe, and in particular in the very low fertility 
countries, is an important issue. Many of the analyses about the consequences of ageing 
that are being discussed by the economic and finance ministers of Europe among others, 
are based on the Eurostat projections which assume an end to the fertility decline. 
Should fertility continue to decline, then all of the consequences of population ageing 
will be more dramatic than currently assumed. 
But there is an even more immediate political dimension which may add some 
urgency to the question of whether governments should get actively involved in trying 
to raise the level of period fertility. Should the dynamic and self-reinforcing 
mechanisms assumed to be at work under this hypothesis indeed become a dominating 
force in determining the future level of fertility, then possible action to counteract this 
trend will have a far greater chance of succeeding if it is implemented soon. Once the 
assumed demographic regime change is far enough advanced, it may be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to reverse. Once the ideal family size of the young generation has begun 
to decline and fall well below replacement, as seems to be happening currently in the 
German-speaking countries, then it may be too late for a reversal of this trend. In this 
respect, particularly the Central and Eastern European countries that used to have 
fertility not so far from replacement level until the transition around 1990, and still have 
high family size ideals today despite a precipitous decline in period fertility, seem to be 
in a critical stage that might still be influenced by policies. If period fertility in these 
countries should increase in the near future – possibly through policies affecting the 
tempo of fertility rather than cohort fertility – this may still help to stop the “tanker” of 
changing family size norms from making a full turn. Through such immediate action, an 
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irreversible demographic regime change might still be stopped by making children a 
part of a normal life again. This will enhance the chance that in the future, young people 
will have their norms shaped in such a way that they still see children as part of the life 
they wish to live, as seems to be the case in France and the Nordic countries. A similar 
chance may still exist in the Mediterranean countries, where fertility declined long ago, 
but the ideals still seem to be rather high on average, at least up to 2001. 
In other words, if we assume that the LFTH will be true, then any attempt to stop 
a demographic regime change in the very low fertility countries is of high urgency and 
some of the measures recommended by McDonald (2006) should be implemented by 
governments with priority and determination. We are used to thinking in a linear fashion 
of gradual fertility trends leading to gradual changes in its consequences. The possibility 
of a non-linear response with positive feedback loops and tipping points at least merits 
further consideration in this context. 
In the case where the mechanisms assumed under the LFTH are not at work and 
the LFTH can be falsified, governments can be more relaxed about the fertility trends 
and take the “wait and see” approach that Van de Kaa (2006) recommends. Hence, the 
evaluation of the LFTH is of critical political importance. 
How can we be better informed about the likelihood that such a possible self-
reinforcing mechanism toward ever-declining birth rates will actually be at work? 
Clearly much more data could be analyzed and collected with the testing of this 
hypothesis in mind. Particularly in the field of relative income, our search of the 
literature resulted in a very scattered and unstructured picture about the trends in 
aspirations and expected income in different parts of Europe. Since relevant data are 
only collected and studies only conducted when there is a specific research agenda on 
the table, we herewith want to put the hypothesis on the table and hope that it will 
inspire more data collection and analyses in the near future. 
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